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RESIDENT ALIENS AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: THE NEED FOR
JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF
FULL FREE SPEECH AND
ASSOCIATION RIGHTS
Before the turn of the twentieth century, the United States Supreme Court
announced an extremely deferential attitude towards legislative and execu-
tive branch decisions regarding the grounds for deportation of aliens.' The
Court's rationale for this hands-off approach rested on the prevailing inter-
national law concepts of sovereignty and the inherent powers of independent
nations to control the presence of foreigners within their borders.2 The
Court stated that the power over immigration vested in the political
branches of government, and immediately characterized Congress' author-
ity over the subject as plenary and largely unfettered by constitutional
constraints.3 The Court also declared congressional actions taken pursuant
to this power to be political questions,4 and thus, virtually unreview-
1. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606-10 (1889) (establishing the govern-
ment's power to exclude foreigners whenever it is in the public interest). Accord Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (holding that the right of a nation to deport
foreigners is absolute and unqualified); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659-61
(1892) (sovereign may "forbid the entrance of foreigners... in such cases... as it may see fit
to prescribe").
2. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 705-07, 713. The early immigration cases endorsed
broad congressional authority over exclusion and deportation, presuming the validity of unfet-
tered power in this area rather than considering the merits. As one commentator explains, the
concept of sovereignty in the immigration context "entailed the unlimited power of the nation
•.. to decide whether, under what conditions, and with what effects it would consent to enter
into a relationship with a stranger." Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1984). See also Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admit-
ted Permanent Resident Alien: The Inherent Limits of the Power to Expel, 69 YALE L.J. 262
(1959) (criticizing the Supreme Court's failure to consider the merits of constitutional chal-
lenges to deportation statutes); Scanlan, Symposium on Academic Freedom: Aliens in the Mar-
ketplace of Ideas: The Government, the Academy, and the McCarran- Walter Act, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 1481 (1988) (the Court's position assumes an absolute power to take any measure to
ensure the nation's self-preservation).
3. See D. MARTIN, MAJOR ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION LAW 17-18 (Federal Judicial
Center 1987) (plenary power doctrine).
4. The political question doctrine precludes judicial review of issues that are best suited
to executive or legislative resolution. In general, the rationale of the doctrine is based upon
due respect for a coordinate branch of government-recognition of the expertise of a certain
branch in handling the issue or a constitutional grant of authority over the issue to a certain
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able.5 The Supreme Court's deferential attitude has become ingrained in
judicial analysis of United States immigration law, despite the fact that the
Court failed to articulate clearly its reasoning.6
Moreover, the Court has demonstrated an alarming readiness to allow
Congress to override first amendment freedoms, such as when it enacted
legislation declaring resident aliens deportable for present or past beliefs and
associations.7 Congress often enacted such statutes in the name of national
security, yet typically there existed little evidence that resident aliens' exer-
cise of free speech and association rights were inherently more dangerous
than the exercise of those same freedoms by United States citizens.' In rec-
ognition of the false premise that all aliens are subversive, the rationale un-
derlying the ideological deportation of resident aliens, Congress recently
enacted temporary legislation that partially eliminates ideology as a ground
for deportation. 9 Specifically, the recent legislation extends first amendment
protection to certain classes of nonimmigrant aliens.' ° Additionally, some
federal courts have begun to subject various provisions of United States im-
migration law to meaningful analysis based upon the same standards of re-
view applicable to citizens' first amendment challenges."
branch. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.15 (3d ed. 1986)
[hereinafter NOWAK].
5. See 2 C. GORDON & S. MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 4.3a
(1989) (the political question doctrine blocked all attempted challenges to "legislative edicts").
6. The rationale possessed questionable validity even at its inception in view of the nu-
merous, strong dissenting opinions submitted in the first cases considering the issue. See, e.g.,
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 732-63 (Brewer, J., Field, J., and Fuller, J., dissenting). See also
Scanlan, supra note 2, at 1499-1500 (noting the Court's continued use of deferential review).
7. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591 (1952) (past membership in the
Communist Party); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292-93 (1904)
(upholding the deportation of an alien anarchist).
8. See, e.g., American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060
(C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that resident aliens enjoy the same scope of first amendment protec-
tion as citizens); see generally Tilner, Ideological Exclusion of Aliens: The Evolution of a Pol-
icy, 2 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (1987) (documenting history of United States immigration law);
Comment, Immigration and the First Amendment, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (1985) (advocating
the same scope of first amendment protection for aliens and citizens).
9. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-
204, § 901, 101 Stat. 1331, 1399-1400 [hereinafter FRAA] (providing that nonimmigrant
aliens are no longer subject to deportation based upon past or present associations or speech).
10. See id. at 1399. Congress is also considering a complete overhaul of United States
immigration law in H.R. 1280. See 134 CONG. REC. S13,800 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1988) (dia-
logue between Sens. Kennedy and Simpson).
11. See, e.g., Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 939-40 (D.C. Cir.
1988); American-Arab, 714 F. Supp. 1060passim (C.D. Cal. 1989); Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F.




This Comment documents the historical development of the Supreme
Court's controversial, and at times inconsistent, position on the scope of resi-
dent aliens' constitutional rights. It next discusses the more liberal views of
the federal courts in recent first amendment challenges to deportation orders
based on ideological grounds. This Comment also examines the inadequacy
of legislative solutions. In conclusion, the author of this Comment argues
for placing the first amendment freedoms of resident aliens on solid constitu-
tional ground by unequivocal judicial recognition of their free speech and
association rights.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES
IMMIGRATION LAW
A. The Origins of Deferential Review: Aliens Have No Right to Remain
in the United States Except at the Pleasure of Congress
In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 12 the United States Supreme Court
upheld the deportation of three Chinese laborers, lawfully admitted to the
United States as resident aliens, based on their failure to obtain certificates of
residence from internal revenue collectors as required by an 1892 law.' 3
Two of the laborers admitted that they had not sought a certificate.' 4 The
third had attempted to obtain the necessary certificate. However, the inter-
nal revenue collector denied his application"5 because he failed to produce
any "credible white witness[es]"' 6 who could verify that he was a resident at
the time Congress enacted the statute. 17
Reaffirming its position in prior cases, the Supreme Court declared that
the power to exclude and deport aliens flowed from the inherent power of a
sovereign nation to conduct international relations.'" Accordingly, the
Court declared that such power vested in the political branches of the gov-
12. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
13. Id. at 699-704, 729. Section 6 of the Act required all Chinese laborers within the
United States, who were lawfully entitled to remain, to apply for a certificate of residence
within one year of passage of the Act. Section 6 made receipt of the certificate contingent upon
the testimony of "at least one credible white witness." Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25,
26.
14. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 702, 703.
15. Id. at 704. The statute implicitly declared nonwhite witnesses to be unreliable. The
Court accepted this determination noting that it stemmed "from the loose notions entertained
by [nonwhite] witnesses of the obligation of an oath." Id. at 730.
16. Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25, 26.
17. See Schuck, supra note 2, at 14 (sharply criticizing Congress' and the Court's racist
view).
18. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 705-07, 713. In the early immigration cases, the Court
often gave a "sweeping endorsement," of Congress' broad power over exclusion and deporta-
tion, describing the plenary nature of the power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty rather
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ernment, and that Congress may exercise this power in an absolute, unquali-
fied manner.'9 Although the Court also stated that Congress' actions
pursuant to this power were subject to constitutional limitations, and thus
judicial review,2 ° the Court failed to analyze the 1892 statute in any mean-
ingful manner. 2 I Having decided that the power over immigration resided
with the legislature, the Court characterized the determination of grounds
for deportation as strictly a political question,22 and as such, "conclusive
upon the judiciary."
2 3
The Court also relied on its view of the prevailing concepts of interna-
tional law24 to conclude that resident aliens are entitled to certain protec-
tions of the host nation, including constitutional guarantees, but only so long
as the host extends an invitation to remain. 25 Thus, borrowing from the
reasoning in an earlier Supreme Court decision,26 the Court indicated that
Congress can summarily revoke whatever rights resident aliens may possess
than any specific constitutional grant of authority. D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 17-18; see also
2 C. GORDON & S. MAILMAN, supra note 5, § 4.3a.
19. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 705, 706.
20. Id. at 711, 713.
21. Numerous writers criticize the Court's refusal to subject immigration law to more
searching analysis. See, e.g., 2 C. GORDON & S. MAILMAN, supra note 5, § 4.3a (once the
Court declared congressional powers over immigration plenary, it did not question the validity
of specific legislation enacted pursuant to that power); D. MARTIN, supra note 3, at 17-19
(noting the Court's failure to discuss constitutional support for the proposition that the polit-
ical branches possessed virtually absolute power over deportation); T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MAR-
TIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 562 (1985) (describing the excessive extent to which
early Supreme Court decisions immunized deportation provisions from constitutional limita-
tions); see also NOWAK, supra note 4, § 14.11 (noting the Court's historic refusal to review
immigration decisions); Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56
COLUM. L. REV. 309, 319 (1956) (describing the Court's reluctance to question the validity of
deportation provisions motivated by suppositions that aliens were inherently subversive).
22. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 731. The Court first expressly articulated the political
question doctrine (which precludes judicial review of matters essentially political in nature and
leaves their resolution to legislative bodies) in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849).
See also 2 C. GORDON & S. MAILMAN, supra note 5, § 4.3a; NOWAK, supra note 4, § 2,15.
23. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 706. See also 2 C. GORDON & S. MAILMAN, supra note 5,
§ 4.3a.
24. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 707-10.
25. Id. at 724. The Court cited several international law authorities supporting a sover-
eign nation's broad power to control foreigners within its borders. Id. at 706-11. However, the
dissenters in Fong Yue Ting emphasized that these principles did not confer an absolute au-
thority to deport. Id. at 734-37, 756 (Brewer, J. and Field, J., dissenting). Cf Schuck, supra
note 2, at 6 (international law also recognizes a sovereign nation's duty to persons within its
borders); AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 (5th ed.
1984) (a two hundred-year-old "minimum international standard" imposed on nations a duty
to treat persons within their borders "in a civilised manner").
26. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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at Congress' pleasure.27 Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court upheld both
the requirement that a Chinese laborer lawfully residing in the United States
obtain a certificate to remain in the United States and that the laborer pre-
sent a white witness to obtain the certificate.2"
The Court further indicated in Fong Yue Ting that the scope of congres-
sional power in this area was so broad that Congress could provide for sum-
mary removal of resident aliens by officers of the executive branch without
judicial trial or examination.2 9 Hence, the Court applied an extremely defer-
ential review to both the procedures and grounds for deportation. More-
over, because the Supreme Court indicated that deportation was not the
equivalent of criminal punishment,3 ° the Court concluded that deportation
statutes and proceedings need not conform to the constitutionally guaran-
teed standards generally applicable to criminal proceedings.3" Thus, the ma-
jority opinion in Fong Yue Ting severely circumscribed resident aliens'
27. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 723. For a strongly worded attack on this extreme judicial
deference, see Schuck, supra note 2, at 14-16 (concluding that the Court abdicated its role to
check congressional abuses of authority in the field of immigration law, and that the Court
"reflexively" reaffirmed its extreme deference throughout its decisions).
28. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 729.
29. Id. at 714, 728. As Professor Schuck relates, "the national government's consent to
allow the alien to enter and remain... could be denied or withdrawn on the basis of arbitrary
criteria and summary procedures that often transgressed liberal principles." Schuck, supra
note 2, at 3. In Fong Yue Ting, the Court applied a deferential standard of review so extreme
that it did not question Congress' findings that Chinese persons were undesirable solely on
account of their race. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 717.
30. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730. The Court simply made a brief statement character-
izing deportation as a civil proceeding, and failed to demonstrate how it differs from a criminal
penalty. Id. This same conclusory statement appears throughout the Court's later decisions,
and immunizes deportation statutes and proceedings from the constitutional constraints of the
ex post facto clauses and the prohibition against bills of attainder. See U.S. CONST. art. I,
§§ 9-10. See also Schuck, supra note 2, at 25 (the Court's perfunctory characterization "pos-
sesses little logical power"); T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 369 (labeling
deportation a civil penalty is a "fiction").
31. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730. See also Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924)
(finding that deportation is not a criminal punishment even though it is severe). While the
Court subsequently expanded resident aliens' due process rights, it has yet to recognize the full
panoply of this constitutional guarantee. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032,
1038-39 (1984) (exclusionary rule does not operate in deportation hearing because it is a purely
civil proceeding); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 28 (1982) (procedures afforded in exclu-
sion proceedings are sufficient for determination of the question of what constitutes an entry
into the United States, even if the alien claims to be a resident alien); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787, 799-800 (1977) (rejecting equal protection challenge and upholding statute that precludes
citizen fathers from applying for the admission of their illegitimate alien children). Moreover,
the Court's opinion in Fong Yue Ting set a dangerous precedent for future first amendment
challenges. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591-92 (1952) (rejecting first
amendment challenge to a deportation order based upon past membership in the Communist
Party).
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constitutional rights to substantive and procedural due process in the depor-
tation context.
However, three members of the Supreme Court submitted strong dissent-
ing opinions in Fong Yue Ting. 32 The dissenting Justices stated that Con-
gress must distinguish between aliens lawfully residing within the country's
borders and those seeking entry. 33 The dissenters noted that according to
both international law and United States constitutional law, resident aliens
acquire a right to remain in the country that mere legislative fiat cannot
revoke.34 In contrast to the majority's extremely deferential approach, each
of the dissenters analyzed the statute and found that it did not comport with
the due process guarantees of the fifth amendment. 35 Two of the dissenting
Justices further concluded that a constitutional guarantee that Congress
could summarily revoke in this manner amounted to no guarantee at all, and
imperiled constitutional safeguards for all persons, citizen and noncitizen, in
all contexts.
36
Refuting the majority's reliance on an unfettered power over deportation
derived from international law, Justice Brewer emphasized that the Consti-
tution delineates the powers of the United States Government and, therefore,
the government can exercise only those powers expressly or impliedly
granted therein. 37 Additionally, he noted that the exercise of both express
and implied powers must conform to constitutional limitations.38 Justice
Brewer thus concluded that the Constitution does not accord Congress an
absolute power over deportation.39 Similarly, Justice Field found the
Court's absolute deference to the congressional action unwarranted and dan-
gerous.' Justice Fuller reasoned that if resident aliens enjoy protection
under the Constitution, as the majority conceded,4" then the question of
32. 149 U.S. at 732, 734, 761 (Brewer, J., Field, J., and Fuller, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 734, passim.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 739-41, 759, 762 (deportation approximated criminal punishment because it
entailed arrest, detention, deprivation of property, and often separation from one's family;
neither legislative fiat nor the arbitrary discretion of an executive official can impose it).
36. Id. at 743, 754 (Brewer, J. and Field, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 737, 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting). Not only did the dissenters state that the
Constitution imposed substantive limits on any authority granted by international law, but
they disagreed with the majority's broad reading of international law principles. Id. at 734-37,
754-56 (Brewer, J. and Field, J., dissenting). Two of the dissenting Justices also objected to
Congress' violation of existing treaty obligations with China, which guaranteed to Chinese
residents the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by U.S. citizens. Id. at 733-34, 752.
38. Id. at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 737-38.
40. Id. at 754-55 (Field, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 724.
[Vol. 39:595
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whether Congress has acted in conformity with the Constitution properly
lies with the judiciary.42
The dissenters also recognized that many provisions of the Bill of Rights
do not distinguish between citizens and other persons, and concluded ac-
cordingly that these provisions applied to all persons within the territorial
boundaries of the United States.43 Two dissenting Justices also character-
ized deportation as a criminal punishment "most severe and cruel"" that
cannot be inflicted in a manner inconsistent with the constitutional guaran-
tees applicable in criminal proceedings.45
Hence, the early Supreme Court decisions addressing immigration law set
the stage for deferential review of the constitutionality of the procedures and
the grounds for deportation. The Court specifically stated that international
law endowed Congress with virtually unreviewable power over deportation
of resident aliens. The Court further indicated that resident aliens could not
invoke the United States Constitution to challenge legislative provisions for
deportation. In this manner, the Supreme Court firmly established that
Congress could grant and revoke at will a resident alien's right to remain in
the United States.
B. The Early History of Deportation Based on Ideology
1. Deportation Based Upon Political Beliefs
Building upon its premise that Congress' power over immigration will be
subject only to the most deferential review, a unanimous Supreme Court
upheld the deportation of an alien anarchist in 1904 in United States ex rel.
Turner v. Williams.46 The Department of Commerce and Labor charged
Turner, a national of Great Britain, with entering the United States in viola-
tion of the immigration laws that mandated the exclusion of anarchists.4 7
42. Id. at 761 (Fuller, J., dissenting) (political question doctrine does not bar considera-
tion of the constitutional limitations on Congress' authority). See infra note 106 and accompa-
nying text.
43. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 739 (Brewer, J., dissenting). Justices Field and Fuller
expressed similar views. Id. at 749, 762 (Field, J. and Fuller, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 740 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 741. Likewise, Justice Field found deportation to be a cruel and unusual pun-
ishment greatly disproportionate to the crime. Id. at 759 (Field, J., dissenting).
46. 194 U.S. 279, 294 (1904).
47. Id. at 281-84. Specifically, Turner fell within sections 2 and 38 of the Act of March 3,
1903, which listed anarchists and others who believe in the overthrow of organized govern-
ment among the classes of aliens excludable and deportable. Act to Regulate the Immigration
of Aliens into the United States, Pub. L. No. 162, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213 (1903). Scholars note
that the 1903 Act marks the beginning of an extensive history of congressional enactments
declaring resident aliens disloyal and rendering them subject to deportation for their political
beliefs and associations. T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 351-52. Despite
1990]
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The immigration officers who arrested Turner found anarchist literature in
his possession, and Turner did not deny that he was an anarchist.48 Turner
contended, however, that the law under which he was arrested violated the
first amendment to the United States Constitution because the provisions
proscribed a particular belief.49
The Court found no first amendment violation in deporting Turner for
being an anarchist.50 Once the Court determined that Turner fell within a
class of persons Congress deemed deportable, its review ended. 51 The Court
concluded that an alien who entered or remained in the United States ille-
gally, in this case an individual who met Congress' description of an undesir-
able alien, did not enjoy protection under the Constitution.52 Moreover, the
Court stated that Congress could constitutionally decide which ideas are
dangerous to the public interest, and enact legislation subjecting aliens who
hold such ideas to deportation.53 Thus, the Court rendered deportation
based upon ideological grounds immune from first amendment scrutiny.54
One Justice, in concurrence, advocated restricting the applicability of this
ground for deportation to alien anarchists who acted upon their beliefs.55
Nevertheless, while noting that the Court's opinion failed to distinguish be-
tween anarchists who actively foment revolution and those who merely hold
such beliefs, the concurring opinion agreed with the majority that Turner
actively sought the overthrow of the United States Government. 6
Congress' longstanding provision for exclusion and deportation of anarchist aliens, Congress
has never defined the term "anarchist." Tilner, supra note 8, at 24 n.167. In substance, the
provisions subjecting Turner to deportation are similar to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(A) and (B),
and 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6)(A) and (B) (1988).
48. Turner, 194 U.S. at 283.
49. Id. at 286.
50. Id. at 292. Many scholars have noted the Court's summary disposition of this issue.
For example, Scanlan notes that the Court "summarily rejected" Turner's first amendment
claim. Scanlan, supra note 2, at 1509. As other commentators explain, the Court apparently
reasoned "that the expulsion statute is not a denial of free speech but is rather a removal from
the country of aliens deemed obnoxious." 2 C. GORDON & S. MAILMAN, supra note 5, § 4.3d.
See also Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 946
(1963) (neither Congress nor the Court ever clearly defined the public interest furthered by
restrictions on aliens' free expression).
51. Tilner notes that in the wake of President McKinley's assassination by an alleged
anarchist, President Theodore Roosevelt strongly encouraged Congress to enact measures im-
puting guilt by association aimed at alien anarchists. Tilner, supra note 8, at 27.
52. Turner, 194 U.S. at 292.
53. Id. at 294. Since Congress viewed revolutionary ideas as a foreign import, its solution
for preventing internal dissension was to deport the perceived source of those ideas-resident
aliens. Tilner, supra note 8, at 71.
54. See Tilner, supra note 8, at 34, 35 nn.237-38.




In Turner, therefore, the Supreme Court expressly and summarily con-
doned congressional enactment of legislation permitting deportation based
on an alien's ideology. The Court's decision in Turner enabled Congress to
restrict the content of a resident alien's speech, free from first amendment
restraints. Thus, after Turner, Congress could constitutionally declare a res-
ident alien deportable for holding a belief that Congress deemed undesirable.
2. Mere Association with a Proscribed Group Furnishes an Adequate
Ground for Deportation
Forty years later, in Bridges v. Wixon, " the Supreme Court again consid-
ered a resident alien's first amendment challenge to a deportation order
based upon ideological grounds. In 1938, eighteen years after Bridges en-
tered the United States, the government tried unsuccessfully to charge him
with deportation on the grounds that he was currently a member or affiliate
of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA), a group which advo-
cated the violent overthrow of the United States Government."' The gov-
ernment's initial failure to discover any evidence warranting deportation
merely led to demands to change the deportation laws to find Bridges "and
all others of similar ilk" deportable.5 9 As a result, Congress amended the
Alien Registration Act in 1940 to provide for the deportation of any alien
who was currently or had at any time in the past been a member of or affili-
ated with a group that advised, advocated, or taught the overthrow of the
United States by force or violence."
By this time, Congress also had created the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS), and placed the Attorney General in charge of the admin-
istration of immigration laws.61 In 1941, the INS charged Bridges with
57. 326 U.S. 135 (1944).
58. Id. at 137-38.
59. Id. at 157-59 (Murphy, J., concurring). See infra note 88. See also Hesse, supra note
2, at 270-71 (describing congressional attempts to render Bridges deportable); Maslow, supra
note 21, at 335-36 (same).
60. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 138. See also Act of June 28, 1940, Pub. L. No. 670, 54 Stat. 673,
repealed by Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163; T.
ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 355 (noting that Congress enacted the amend-
ment in response to the Communist Party of the United States' (CPUSA) expulsion of alien
members attempting to "immunize" them from deportation). This amendment, commonly
known as the Smith Act, abrogated the earlier Court decision in Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S.
22 (1939). In Kessler, the Court construed the deportation statute then in force to require
present membership in or affiliation with a proscribed group. Lacking evidence of a clear
congressional intent to the contrary, the Court held past membership or affiliation an insuffi-
cient ground. Id. at 30.
61. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 139-40 nn.2-3. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-
414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1988)) [hereinafter
INA]. For a description of the Attorney General's authority under current immigration law,
1990]
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deportation pursuant to the amended statute." An immigration inspector
conducted the subsequent deportation hearing and concluded that Bridges
had been affiliated with groups advocating the overthrow of the government
after entering the United States.6 3 The Board of Immigration Appeals re-
versed the inspector's findings but the Attorney General, upon review, reaf-
firmed the inspector's conclusion and ordered Bridges deported. 64 Bridges
challenged the legality of his detention through a writ of habeas corpus in
federal district court.65 The district court denied his petition, and the court
of appeals affirmed that decision by a divided vote.6 6 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari because of the serious nature of the issues involved.6 7
The Court held that Bridges' conduct and speech did not rise to the level
of that proscribed by the statute.68 The Court's decision rested primarily
upon statutory construction and a determination that Congress had not in-
tended to equate the term "affiliation" with casual, innocent association.
6 9
The majority opinion briefly mentioned Bridge's free speech claim, and did
not clearly define the scope of first amendment protection enjoyed by
aliens.7 °
In construing the word "affiliated," the Supreme Court concluded that the
term must mean more than mere sympathy or association with a group.7 1
see Maslow, supra note 21, at 314. See 2 C. GORDON & S. MAILMAN, supra note 5, § 4.4
(explanation of authority delegated to the executive branch); T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN,
supra note 21, at 403-04 (outlining the mechanics of instituting deportation procedures).
62. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 139, 159 (Murphy, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 139. See Maslow, supra note 21, at 310 (criticizing INS' total control of the
deportation process).
64. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 140. The opinion gives no reasons for the Board of Immigration
Appeals' reversal or the Attorney General's deportation order. Id. For a discussion of the
alarming lack of independence between the enforcement and adjudicatory functions of the
INS, see Schuck, supra note 2, at 30-34 (noting that neither the agency's enabling statute nor
the Court's decisions require an impartial decisionmaker to preside at deportation hearings).
The Court in Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955), permitted Congress to abrogate an
earlier Supreme Court decision in which the Court suggested that the Constitution required an
impartial decisionmaker. See Schuck, supra note 2, at 32-33 (questioning the Court's reason-
ing in Marcello, and criticizing the Court's decision to allow Congress to defy constitutional
limitations through legislative fiat).
65. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 140.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 143, 147-49.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 148.
71. Id. at 142. See also Act of Oct. 16, 1918, ch. 186, § 1, 40 Stat. 1012; Act of June 5,
1920, ch. 231, § 1(e), 41 Stat. 1008, Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, §§ 2, 23, 54 Stat. 673,
repealed by 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988). For further explanation of "affiliation," see 2 C. GORDON
& S. MAILMAN, supra note 5, §§ 4.1 ic, 4.1 Id (noting that current immigration law includes a
broader spectrum of activities within the term "affiliation").
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The Court stated that to fall within the Alien Registration Act of 1940, a
resident alien must forge "bonds of mutual cooperation and alliance"
through conduct that indicates a continuing relationship complete with "re-
ciprocal duties and responsibilities." 72 Moreover, the Court indicated that
an alien who cooperates only in the lawful activities of an organization does
not by implication share its unlawful objectives, and therefore is not "affili-
ated" in the statutorily proscribed manner.73 Ultimately, the Court con-
cluded that the agency misinterpreted the statute, thereby rendering Bridges'
hearing unfair, and thus the Court did not discuss the constitutional issue74
of whether Congress could declare mere association with a proscribed group
a ground for deportation.
The Court's opinion in Bridges reflected a view of the nature of deporta-
tion markedly different from prior cases.75 Previously, in characterizing de-
portation proceedings as civil, the Court shut its eyes to the drastic
consequences that attend an order of deportation.76 In Bridges, however, the
Court repeatedly emphasized that deportation was tantamount to criminal
punishment 77 in that it "may result in the loss 'of all that makes life worth
living.' ,78 As a result, the Court's opinion suggested that the same stan-
dards of fairness required in a criminal proceeding ought to apply in the
deportation context.79
However, the Court devoted less than one paragraph to a cursory recogni-
tion that resident aliens enjoy rights of free speech and free press, and that
Bridges' publications and statements had not crossed the line into advocacy
of subversive conduct.8" The Court's opinion, however, arguably suggested
that if Congress intended to enact a statute making mere association suffi-
72. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 142.
73. Id. at 143-44, 146. Underlying the Court's emphasis that the government must show
a consistent course of conduct to further the unlawful aims of the group is the principle that it
is unconstitutional to impute guilt by mere association, even in the deportation context. See 2
C. GORDON & S. MAILMAN, supra note 5, § 4.10a; Comment, supra note 8, at 1909.
74. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 156.
75. Cf Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (rejecting the argument
that deportation is tantamount to criminal punishment).
76. Id.
77. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 147, 153-54.
78. Id. at 147 (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)).
79. Id. at 153-54. See also Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (stating that
because deportation is a severe penalty, deportation statutes must be construed in favor of the
alien); T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 21, at 372 (holding that Congress has a duty
to provide notice to aliens of the grounds for deportation). But see 2 C. GORDON & S. MAIL-
MAN, supra note 5, § 4. lc (express legislative intent contrary to a favorable construction over-
rides the principle of most favorable construction).
80. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 148.
1990]
Catholic University Law Review
cient grounds for deportation, it would violate the first amendment s.8  In
construing the statute to avoid constitutional conflict, the Court in effect
based its interpretation on constitutional grounds.8 2 Unfortunately, the ma-
jority's opinion left the door open for Congress to enact subsequent legisla-
tion subjecting aliens to deportation on purely ideological grounds.1
3
In contrast to the majority opinion in Bridges, the concurring opinion
evinced a much stronger commitment to protecting the free speech and asso-
ciation rights of resident aliens.84 The concurrence found the 1940 Alien
Registration Act facially invalid for two reasons.8 5 The opinion identified
the statute's first fatal flaw as its substitution of guilt by mere association for
a finding of personal guilt, in violation of the fundamental principles under-
lying United States law.86 Second, the concurrence asserted that the Court
should have subjected the statute to the prevailing first amendment scrutiny,
namely, the "clear and present danger" test,8 7 rather than sidestepping the
issue through statutory construction.
The concurrence indicated that the decision to institute deportation pro-
ceedings against Bridges rested not upon national security reasons but rather
upon an undifferentiated fear of Bridges' successful union activities.18 Remi-
niscent of the concerns the dissenters expressed in Fong Yue Ting, 89 the con-
curring opinion further noted that although Congress enacts immigration
legislation pursuant to a plenary power, the legislation is not immune from
judicial review and does not thereby pass outside the ambit of the Constitu-
81. See 2 C. GORDON & S. MAILMAN, supra note 5, § 4.10a; Comment, supra note 8, at
1908-09 (in construing the statute to avoid constitutional conflict, the Court based its decision
on constitutional law principles).
82. Cf Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. 729, 743 (D.D.C. 1988) (interpreting the Supreme
Court's prior decisions as based on constitutional law, not merely statutory construction),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See also infra note 220.
83. See, e.g., Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 831, ch. 1024, § 22, 64 Stat. 1006,
1008 (mere membership or association with the Communist Party); 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(6)(C)
(1970) (same); FRAA, supra note 9, § 901(a)(3), 101 Stat. 1331, 1400 (membership or affilia-
tion with the Palestine Liberation Organization).
84. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 157, 159-60 (Murphy, J., concurring) (when the government bla-
tantly ignores the Bill of Rights, "the full wrath of constitutional condemnation descends upon
the action").
85. Id. at 162-64.
86. Id. at 163.
87. Id. at 164. In Schenck v. United States, the Court held that Congress cannot constitu-
tionally restrict speech unless the speech presents "a clear and present danger that [it] will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
88. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 157-59 (Murphy, J., concurring). The House of Representatives
passed a special bill declaring Bridges' presence in the United States "hurtful" and mandating
his deportation. Id. at 158.




tion.9° The concurrence also stated that if an alien's constitutional rights
vanish "when deportation officials encircle him" then the constitutional
guarantees possessed by an alien are meaningless. 9
Notably, the concurrence made no distinction between citizens and resi-
dent aliens when determining the standard of review applicable to their first
amendment challenges.92 Reasoning that INS should only order deporta-
tion when a real and imminent threat to national security exists,93 the con-
curring Justice determined that the liberties of resident aliens could not
depend on conformity with Congress' declaration of the mainstream views
and beliefs of United States society. 94 The concurrence also stated, without
elaboration, that Congress possessed ample means to protect the public in-
terest without resorting to infringement of speech and association rights.95
In conclusion, the concurrence added that to diminish the constitutional
rights of an individual, even a resident alien with possibly radical views,
strikes a blow against the right of free speech for all.96
Despite the promising tone of Bridges, the Court remained unwilling to
make a strong commitment to the free speech and association rights of resi-
dent aliens. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,97 decided less than a decade after
Bridges, the Court retreated from its requirement that the government show
proof of a current, meaningful association with a proscribed group to sustain
a deportation order. In Harisiades, the Court consolidated three cases for
review.98 Each case dealt with the constitutional question that the Court left
unresolved in Bridges: specifically, whether Congress could constitutionally
subject a resident alien to deportation based upon the alien's membership in
a proscribed group, even though the alien terminated that membership prior
to enactment of the Alien Registration Act of 1940.99
90. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 160-61 (Murphy, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 162.
92. See Comment, supra note 8, at 1908-09.
93. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 165 (Murphy, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 166. As one commentator observed, Congress consistently designed deportation
statutes to effect precisely this result. Scanlan, supra note 2, at 1502-03. See also Comment,
supra note 8, at 1922 (the Court should not allow Congress to define acceptable beliefs).
95. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 165 (Murphy, J., concurring). See also Maslow, supra note 21, at
323 (consular and immigration officials can scrutinize applications for admission; the govern-
ment can impose criminal sanctions for criminal conduct).
96. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 166 (Murphy, J., concurring). See also NOWAK, supra note 4,
§§ 16.2, 16.6 (the free exchange and competition of ideas reveals the ideas of the greatest truth
and validity, and truth will prevail over falsehoods).
97. 342 U.S. 580 (1951).
98. Id. at 581.
99. Id.; see also Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, §§ 2, 23, 54 Stat. 670.
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In Harisiades, each resident alien entered the United States as a child,
married another resident alien, or in one case a United States citizen, and all
had children who were United States citizens."°° Additionally, each resident
alien admitted joining the CPUSA for varying periods of time,'0 ' although
each alien denied personal belief in the use of force or violence to overthrow
the Federal Government.' 2 The INS conducted administrative hearings
and ordered all three resident aliens deported for their post-entry member-
ship in an organization that advocated the violent overthrow of the govern-
ment. 0 3 The Court affirmed the deportation order of all three persons."
The Court began its analysis in Harisiades by reaffirming its earlier posi-
tion that Congress' authority to expel and deport is an inherent power be-
stowed upon sovereign states by international law.' 05 The Court stated that
Congress, therefore, may terminate at will the resident alien's right to re-
main in the United States in peace or wartime.'0 6 Following its own prece-
dent, '0 7 the Court declared that the development and implementation of an
immigration policy is an exercise of the power to conduct foreign rela-
tions,"°8 which rests with the political branches of government, and thus is
virtually immune from judicial review.'0 9 The Court further noted that
Congress passed the Alien Registration Act of 1940 just prior to United
100. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 581-83.
101. Id. Harisiades was a member from 1925 until 1939, when the CPUSA terminated all
alien memberships. Mascitti joined the CPUSA in 1923 and resigned due to his personal lack
of interest in 1929. Coleman was an intermittent member, spending a total of four to five years
in the CPUSA. Id.
102. Id. at 582-83. With respect to the Communist Party, section 22 of the Subversive
Activities and Control Act of 1950 eliminated the requirement that the government demon-
strate that the organization to which an alien belonged advocated the overthrow of the govern-
ment by force. Pub. L. No. 831, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 1006. Mere membership in or affiliation
with the Communist Party remains a ground for deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6)(C) (1988).
103. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 582-83.
104. Id. at 596.
105. Id. at 586-87. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893); The
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603-06 (1889).
106. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 587. In this regard, the Court failed to separate the interna-
tional law issue (whether Congress has the inherent power derived from international law to
deport aliens) from the domestic, constitutional law issue (whether Congress exercised its
power to deport consistent with first amendment limitations). See Hesse, supra note 2, at 282
(dispensing with the issue on the basis of international law merely avoided the issue).
107. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730-31.
108. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588-89.
109. Id. at 589. Hesse maintains that Harisiades presented a constitutional question of first
impression and that the prior cases the Court cited in support of its decision were not on point.
Hesse further asserts that the Court's focus on international law as the source of the power to
deport simply evaded the issue of whether Congress constitutionally exercised its authority.
He also criticized the Court for basing its opinion on summary declarations and assumptions.
Hesse, supra note 2, at 271-75, 282.
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States involvement in World War II, in response to evidence that Commu-
nists within the United States were actively thwarting the country's prepara-
tions for war.10 In this context, the Court concluded that "it would be rash
and irresponsible . . . to deny or qualify the Government's power of
deportation."" 1 '
In contrast to the Court's lengthy discourse on the broad scope of con-
gressional authority over immigration matters, the Court only briefly dis-
cussed first amendment limitations on that authority. 1 2 The Court did state
that the first amendment prohibited Congress from repressing all speech that
Congress found distasteful. 1 3 The Court further noted that it had a duty to
distinguish protected advocacy of radical doctrines from unprotected incite-
ment of violence."
14
Thus, while the Court acknowledged in a perfunctory manner that the
Constitution protects the advocacy of Communist political doctrine, 1 5 it
clearly did not distinguish between such advocacy and actual incitement to
lawless action.1'6 As a result, the Court rejected the aliens' first amendment
challenge by simply stating that Congress can prohibit inciting the over-
throw of the government by force, especially in view of the fact that our
system of government allows for peaceful change through the electoral pro-
cess. "' Hence, while Harisiades can arguably be read to apply the same
110. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 590. But see Scanlan, supra note 2, at 1518 ("The national
security argument for the ideological provisions masks their true purpose . . . . Thus, the
threat particular Communists posed in Harisiades and Dennis was not to America's nuclear
secrets, but to the prevailing American political ideology.").
111. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 591.
112. Id. at 591-92.
113. Id. at 592.
114. Id.
115. Id. The Court cited its recent decision in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(195 1), without elaboration. In Dennis, the Court held that intentionally advocating and con-
spiring to bring about the overthrow of the government presented an imminent threat that
Congress had a right to prevent. Some commentators conclude that the Court misapplied
Dennis. See Comment, supra note 8, at 1910 (noting that the Supreme Court never indicated
how the past affiliation of the resident aliens with the CPUSA posed a security threat); Hesse,
supra note 2, at 285 (the Court failed to explain how the fact pattern in Harisiades met the test
set forth in Dennis).
116. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 592. See also T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 21, at
351 (discussing Justice Jackson's "cursory treatment" of the first amendment issue); Scanlan,
supra note 2, at 1510 (same).
117. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 592. One commentator concludes that the Court's opinion
neatly divided all speech into that which is related to the lawful political process and is there-
fore protected, and that which incites violence and therefore does not enjoy protection. Scan-
lan, supra note 2, at 1510. Professor Hesse adds that the Court failed to explain how the
resident aliens' past activities met the Dennis test. Hesse, supra note 2, at 285 n.153.
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scope of first amendment protection to resident aliens as then applied to
citizens, it clearly made no explicit recognition of this principle."'
In Harisiades, the Court also retreated from its brief characterization in
Bridges of deportation as a criminal punishment." 9 Specifically, the Court's
opinion in Harisiades emphasized that deportation was a civil proceeding,
and thus foreclosed any argument that the amended statute violated the ex
post facto clause of the Constitution, 120 which the Court traditionally had
construed as applicable only to criminal proceedings.' 2 ' In addition, the
Court in Harisiades failed to address the issue of personal guilt even though
the majority opinion in Bridges indicated that only a meaningful relationship
and conduct demonstrating that the alien shared the illegal aims of the
group rendered the alien deportable under the Alien Registration Act of
1940.122 Nowhere in the Harisiades opinion did the Court consider whether
any of the resident aliens ever believed in the propriety of violent overthrow
of the United States Government, let alone whether they actively sought to
further that illegal aim.'23 In effect, the Court concluded that because Con-
gress had determined that the CPUSA promoted the overthrow of the gov-
ernment, any resident alien who had ever been a member of the CPUSA
necessarily advocated that unlawful aim and could be deported.
124
118. While the precise scope of resident aliens' first amendment rights in the deportation
context remains unclear, Harisiades indicates that a less searching inquiry applies, and the case
represents the latest Court decision on this issue. Scanlan, supra note 2, at 1510-11. See also
Maslow, supra note 21, at 337 (recognizing an "ever widening gulf" between citizens' and
resident aliens' first amendment protection).
119. See Bridges, 326 U.S. at 147, 153; Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1947).
Several commentators conclude that the permanent disabilities accompanying an order of de-
portation render it more drastic than many criminal penalties. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 2,
at 26-27; 2 C. GORDON & S. MAILMAN, supra note 5, § 4.6d; C. GORDON & E. GORDON,
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW § 4.1b (1985); Maslow, supra note 21, at 321.
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. See Hesse, supra note 2, at 285-86 (asserting that the
Court's conclusion that ex post facto analysis had no application rested on an erroneous read-
ing of prior cases and an artificial distinction between criminal penalties and deportation).
121. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594-95. But see Maslow, supra note 21, at 330 (noting that the
Court "brushed aside" four authoritative opinions holding the ex post facto clause applicable
to civil legislation).
122. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 142. Notably, the Court's opinion in Harisiades omits any refer-
ence to Bridges even for the purpose of distinguishing the prior case.
123. Perhaps the Court failed to address the issue because "there was no ground for con-
cluding that their involvement had ever approached the level of advocacy, much less incite-
ment." Scanlan, supra note 2, at 1518.
124. Scholars have criticized the Court's tolerance of guilt by association no matter how
brief or innocent as "indubitably severe." 2 C. GORDON & S. MAILMAN, supra note 5, § 4. 10a.
See also C. GORDON & E. GORDON, supra note 119, § 4.16 (1985); Maslow, supra note 21, at




Justice Douglas, author of the majority opinion in Bridges, filed a strong
dissent in Harisiades. 125 Emphasizing the absence of a distinction between
citizens and noncitizens, Justice Douglas reasoned that the Bill of Rights
does not allow Congress to label a former member of the CPUSA "forever
dangerous," nor does it allow punishment by banishment for one's past
political beliefs.126 In addition, he indicated that the position the majority
opinion expressed in Fong Yue Ting that Congress has completely unfettered
power to deport resident aliens conflicted with the constitutional guarantees
of free speech and due process. 127 Similarly, Justice Douglas argued that
because congressional authority over deportation was implied from the ex-
press power to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," 128 whereas an
individual's free speech and due process rights are expressly granted, 129 the
express rights should take precedence over the implied congressional power
to deport. 130  Justice Douglas concluded that unless some demonstrable
threat to national security existed, Congress exceeded its powers when it
revoked at will an alien's constitutionally guaranteed rights. 3
The Supreme Court's opinion in Galvan v. Press, 132 decided shortly after
Harisiades, further illustrates the Court's reluctance to afford resident aliens'
first amendment rights the same degree of constitutional protection as that
of citizens. Although Galvan arose as a fifth amendment due process chal-
lenge, it nonetheless typified the Supreme Court's readiness to tolerate the
restriction of resident aliens' association rights 133 in the deportation con-
125. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 598-601 (Douglas, J. joined by Black, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 598 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Cf Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500,
510-11 (1964) (mere membership in the CPUSA is not conclusive proof that a person adheres
to the unlawful aims of the group). See infra notes 153-69 and accompanying text. Maslow
sees the statute's punishment of past beliefs as completely unnecessary and counterproductive.
He writes that former members "are often the most effective exposers of [communist propa-
ganda] because they have been immunized by disillusion. But as a result of the existing law,
ex-Communists cannot reveal their past membership without running the risk of deportation."
Maslow, supra note 21, at 336-37 (footnotes omitted). See also Hesse, supra note 2, at 287
(questioning the Court's unreasoned acceptance of an irrebuttable presumption of subversive-
ness based on past conduct); NOWAK, supra note 4, § 16.6 (suppression of speech simply
drives it underground and creates martyrs).
127. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 598-99 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Fong Yue Ting, 149
U.S. at 705-06, 713.
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
129. See id. amends. I, V.
130. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 599 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also NOWAK, supra note 4,
§ 16.7(a) (the right to free speech ranks first among equals).
131. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 601 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
132. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
133. As early as 1937, the Supreme Court began to link the rights of free speech and assem-
bly, and suggest that an implied right of association existed. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353, 364 (1937). The Supreme Court expressly recognized the right of association as a right
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text.' 34 Galvan presented the Supreme Court with another challenge to a
statutory scheme whereby group membership rendered resident aliens de-
portable.' 35 The Internal Security Act of 1950 (the 1950 Act)' 36 gave the
United States Attorney General the authority to deport any alien who, at
any time before or after entry into the United States, had been a member of
or affiliated with the CPUSA.1 37 Thus, the 1950 Act did not require current
membership in the CPUSA. In addition, in the 1950 Act Congress statuto-
rily defined the CPUSA as a group that advocated the violent overthrow of
the United States Government.
138
Galvan entered the United States in 1918 and maintained continuous resi-
dence except for short, intermittent trips to his native country of Mexico. 13 9
In 1950, the INS ordered Galvan deported on the grounds that, subsequent
derived from first amendment free speech and assembly rights in NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958). Accordingly, the Court also held that alleged violations of citizens'
rights to associate were subject to strict scrutiny. Id.
134. Hesse finds that the Court's opinion in Galvan suffers from the same lack of reasoned
analysis and misinterpretation of prior case law which pervaded Harisiades. Hesse, supra note
2, at 287, passim.
135. Galvan, 347 U.S. at 525.
136. Pub. L. No. 831, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987, 1006, 1008. Cf 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6)(C)
(1970) (membership or affiliation with the Communist Party and other totalitarian groups
constitutes grounds for deportation).
137. President Truman had vetoed the Act as "thought control." However, both houses of
Congress overrode the veto by large margins and enacted a measure embodying an unrea-
soned, emotional response to the current wave of anti-communist sentiment. Tilner, supra
note 8, at 60-61. For the same reasons, President Truman later vetoed the INA of 1952, ch.
477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1988)). Tilner, supra note 8,
at 64. See also Maslow, supra note 21, at 309 (strong attack on legislation motivated by "fears,
hostilities and suspicions of the alien"). For further treatment of the INA of 1952, see 2 C.
GORDON & S. MAILMAN, supra note 5, § 4. Ia (noting that the grounds for deportation apply
retroactively and that no statute of limitation applies).
138. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 831, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987.
See 2 C. GORDON & S. MAILMAN, supra note 5, §§ 4. 10a, 4.1 lb(3) and (4). However, if the
membership or affiliation was involuntary it did not constitute grounds for deportation.
Rowolt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115, 120 (1957) (one year membership to obtain the necessities of
life insufficient grounds for deportation). The validity of the legislative determination that the
CPUSA was a subversive group was not before the Court in Galvan. However, the Court later
upheld the statutory declaration and sustained the registration requirements of section 7 of the
Subversive Activities and Control Act in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities & Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961). Yet, the Court subsequently struck down other provisions of that Act
when citizens challenged the provisions as unconstitutional abridgements of free speech and
the implicit fifth amendment right to travel. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262-63
(1967) (citizens' free speech and association); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500,
505-08, 517 (1964) (citizens' right to travel).
139. Galvan, 347 U.S. at 523.
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to his entry, he had been a member of the CPUSA.14° Galvan challenged
the order as a violation of his fifth amendment right to due process.
14 1
Using a deferential standard of review,142 the Court held that there was no
violation of due process where Congress, pursuant to findings, made the de-
termination that past or present membership in the CPUSA without more
rendered a resident alien deportable.143 Accordingly, the Court rejected
Galvan's argument that the 1950 Act should reach only those aliens who
knowingly joined the CPUSA with the intent to further its unlawful aims. 
1"
Instead, the Court found that neither the language of the statute nor the
congressional intent expressed in the legislative history distinguished be-
tween CPUSA members who joined the party knowing of its purpose to
overthrow the Government by force and those members who joined unaware
of its illegal aim. 145 The Court stated that sufficient grounds for deportation
existed where a resident alien willingly joined the CPUSA. 146 The Court
thereby condoned guilt by mere association as a constitutional grounds for
deportation. '4 7
In a peculiar twist, the Court suggested in the latter portion of its Galvan
opinion that the 1950 Act trammeled upon fifth amendment due process
rights because it failed to distinguish between knowing and innocent mem-
bership, especially when the alien committed the proscribed conduct before
membership in the CPUSA constituted grounds for deportation.14 8 The
140. Id. At his deportation hearing, Galvan denied any participation in the CPUSA, ex-
cept as related to union activities. However, his prior admission of membership during pre-
hearing interrogation and the testimony of a single witness convinced the Hearing Officer that
Galvan had been a member from 1944 to 1946. Id. at 524.
141. Id. at 525.
142. Id. at 529. Specifically, the Court deferred to congressional findings that communism
was a subversive, worldwide movement with the purpose of establishing a Communist dicta-
torship through covert and violent operations. The Court made no further analysis of a link
between mere membership and promotion of the unlawful aims of the CPUSA. In view of the
findings, the Court simply declared that the classification of past and present members as
deportable was not "so baseless" that it violated due process. Id.
143. Id. at 529-30.
144. Id. at 525-26.
145. Id. at 526, 528. An assumption that Congress has completely unfettered authority to
deem certain categories of aliens deportable underlies the Court's unquestioning acceptance of
the statute's validity. Hesse, supra note 2, at 288.
146. Galvan, 347 U.S. at 528.
147. Justices Black and Douglas strongly contested this conclusion arguing instead that the
government must show evidence that Galvan knew of the CPUSA's illegal purposes and that
he had an intent to further them. Id. at 532-34 (Black, J. and Douglas, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 530-31. The dissenters emphasized that at the time of Galvan's membership it
was lawful to join the CPUSA and concluded that Galvan's deportation constituted a punish-
ment for his past political beliefs, which violated his fifth amendment due process rights. Id. at
532-34 (Black, J. and Douglas, J., dissenting). The INA of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1157
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Court also referred to its own recent extension of substantive due process as
a limit on the exercise of all congressional powers,149 implying that such a
constraint should also apply in the immigration context. Likewise, the
Court characterized deportation as the near equivalent of criminal punish-
ment, and suggested, therefore, that ex post facto analysis could apply to
deportation statutes.' Thus, the Court in Galvan impliedly recognized that
earlier Supreme Court decisions rested on questionable analytical founda-
tions. However, the Court remained unwilling to reverse the long estab-
lished deferential review of deportation statutes.
After Turner, Harisiades, and Galvan, extensive precedent and legislative
practices giving Congress exclusive, virtually unreviewable power to develop
and implement immigration policies burdened the Court.' 5 ' The Supreme
Court's decisions left the resident alien largely outside the protection of the
first amendment.' 5 2 Furthermore, while the Court after Harisiades has not
directly addressed a resident alien's first amendment challenge to a deporta-
tion order, the Court has continued to cite Turner, Harisiades, and Galvan in
its most recent opinions addressing other aspects of immigration law.'
53
Thus, the Court's decisions upholding the constitutionality of ideological
provisions for deportation remain binding precedent.
C. The Gulf Between the Constitutional Rights Accorded Citizens and
Resident Aliens Widens
Contemporaneous with the Supreme Court's continued restriction of resi-
dent aliens' speech and association rights, the Court expanded various con-
stitutional rights of citizens even where Congress based its restrictions of
citizens' fundamental freedoms on national security interests.' 54 For exam-
(1988), also in effect at the time the Court decided Galvan, contained no statute of limitations
with respect to any of the grounds for deportation. For a scathing criticism of this omission,
see Maslow, supra note 21, at 309-10, 321.
149. Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530.
150. Id. at 531.
151. See id. at 522; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1951); United States ex rel.
Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904); see also supra notes 46-56, 97-150 and accompanying
text.
152. See Scanlan, supra note 2, at 1508-09 (noting that the Court has recognized only
"nominal" free speech and association rights). See also T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra
note 21, at 351.
153. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-39 (1984) (exclusionary rule
does not operate in deportation hearing because it is a purely civil proceeding); Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-37 (1982) (due process); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798-900 (1977)
(equal protection component of fifth amendment due process).
154. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965) (first amendment
right to receive Communist literature and similar information); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S.
163, 168 (1964) (Congress violated the equal protection component of fifth amendment due
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pie, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 155 native born United States citizens
who were members of the CPUSA challenged section 6 of the Subversive
Activities and Control Act of 1950 (Subversive Activities Act)'5 6 as violat-
ing their first amendment guarantees of free speech and association, and in-
fringing their fifth amendment right to travel.' 7 The statement of
congressional findings in the Subversive Activities Act indicated that Con-
gress believed that a worldwide Communist movement existed in the 1950's.
Congress also determined that the Communist movement's aim of achieving
world domination posed a threat to the national security of the United
States.'58 The congressional findings further stated that travel by Commu-
nist Party members and agents furthered the objective of world domina-
tion.' 59 Thus, section 6 of the Subversive Activities Act made it unlawful to
issue a passport to any member of a "Communist-action organization.
' 6
0
In Aptheker, the Court did not reach the merits of the CPUSA members'
first amendment challenge, but struck down the statute as an overly broad,
indiscriminate restriction on a citizen's right to travel, a right implicit in the
liberty guaranteed by the fifth amendment.' 6 ' Recognizing that domestic
laws and regulations made it illegal for a United States citizen to travel to
certain foreign countries without a passport, the Court determined that sec-
tion 6 effectively precluded travel by members of any Communist organiza-
tion as defined by the Subversive Activities Act.162 Reasoning that a citizen
could not be forced to surrender one constitutional right (freedom of associa-
tion), to exercise another (the right to travel), the Court rejected the Govern-
ment's argument that a citizen could restore his right to travel by
relinquishing his membership in the proscribed group.' 63 The Court indi-
process when it enacted legislation that assumed naturalized citizens are inherently less loyal
or more dangerous than native born citizens).
155. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
156. 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1982) (denial of passports to members of the Communist Party).
157. Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 504 n.4.
158. 50 U.S.C. § 781 (statement of congressional findings).
159. Id.
160. Id. In relevant part, section 3(3) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950
defined a "Communist-action organization" as:
(a) any organization in the United States (other than a diplomatic representative
or mission ... ) which (i) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the
foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist move-
ment.., and (ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of such world Commu-
nist movement ... and
(b) any section... or cell of any organization defined in subparagraph (a) ....
50 U.S.C. § 782.
161. Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 505.
162. Id. at 507. See also 50 U.S.C. § 782.
163. Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 507.
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cated that where a fundamental right is at stake, the legislature must nar-
rowly draft its statute to achieve even a substantial, concededly legitimate
end such as national security."' The Court, therefore, determined that sec-
tion 6 swept impermissibly broad because the provision made no distinction
between citizens who knowingly joined and knowingly furthered the illegal
aims of the CPUSA and unwitting members.'
65
The Court recognized yet another flaw in the Subversive Activities Act,
namely, its failure to recognize that the extent and the nature of a given
member's activities on behalf of the group indicated whether travel by that
individual would result in the harm Congress intended to prevent. 166 There-
fore, contrary to the language of section 6, the Court concluded that mere
membership was not conclusive evidence that a person adhered to the un-
lawful aims of a group, nor was it proof that a person posed a danger to
national security.167 The Court noted that in hearings before the House Un-
American Activities Committee prior to enactment of section 6, the Justice
Department argued against branding as disloyal a member of a group based
merely on the fact of membership, and characterized section 6 as unneces-
sary. 168 The executive branch expressed a similar view that the use of less
drastic measures which preserved individual freedoms would not compro-
mise national security.169 Declaring that "precision must be the touchstone
of legislation so affecting basic freedoms,"' 170 the Court determined that the
overbroad language of section 6 could not be construed to avoid constitu-
tional conflict, and thus struck down the statute as facially invalid.'
Shortly after its decision of Aptheker, the Court considered a challenge to
the constitutionality of section 5 of the Subversive Activities Act of 1950172
in United States v. Robel. 17 Section 5 made it unlawful for any member of a
Communist action group 74 to hold any employment in any defense facil-
164. Id. at 508-09.
165. Id. at 510.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 511.
168. Id. at 513 n.12.
169. Id. at 514.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 514-15. In concurrence, Justice Black maintained that despite Congress' broad
power to regulate foreign affairs, the entire Subversive Activities and Control Act of 1950
unconstitutionally abridged first amendment free speech, press and association, as well as sev-
eral other provisions of the Constitution. Id. at 518 (Black, J., concurring). In a separate
concurrence, Justice Douglas noted that illegal conduct should form the basis for punishment,
and cautioned against the restriction of individual liberties merely because some individuals
choose to abuse these liberties. Id. at 520 (Douglas, J., concurring).
172. 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(1)(D).
173. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
174. See supra note 160.
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ity. '75 Robel, a United States citizen and member of the CPUSA, continued
to work as a machinist at a Seattle, Washington shipyard one year after the
Secretary of Defense, in accordance with his statutory authority, declared
the shipyard a defense facility.' 7 6 The government charged Robel with
" 'unlawfully and willfully engag[ing] in employment' at the shipyard with
knowledge of the outstanding order against the Party and with knowledge
and notice of the shipyard's designation as a defense facility .... 177
Unlike the deference the Court accorded to early congressional exercises
of foreign affairs and national security powers,' 78 the Court in Robel de-
clared that Congress' passage of a particular statute pursuant to its war
power or in the name of national defense did not free Congress from consti-
tutional limitations. 179 Expressing a position remarkably similar to Justice
Douglas' dissent in Harisiades, '80 the Court recognized that national defense
included the defense of the individual's rights of free speech and association,
and that unnecessary derogation of those rights in the name of national se-
curity subverted the public interest.' 8 '
Thus, while the Court conceded that the Federal Government had a sub-
stantial interest in safeguarding the nation's defense facilities,' 8 2 the Court
also stated that Congress remained obliged to draft narrowly the statute so
as to achieve its goal without infringing first amendment rights. Accord-
ingly, in Robel, the Supreme Court concluded that section 5 was fatally
flawed in its failure to distinguish between an individual who joined a Com-
munist group cognizant of the group's unlawful aims and actively sought to
promote those ends, and an individual who unknowingly joined a Commu-
nist front organization without any intent to further its illegal aims.'8 3 The
Court determined that section 5 stifled even the legitimate exercise of first
amendment rights because it imputed guilt by mere association.' 84
The Court further noted that less drastic alternatives existed in legislation
that already proscribed the conduct Congress sought to deter by this provi-
175. 50 U.S.C. § 784.
176. Robe, 389 U.S. at 260.
177. Id. at 260-61.
178. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705-06, 713 (1893); United
States ex ret. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 294 (1904).
179. Robe, 389 U.S. at 263-64.
180. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 599-600 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
see also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 165 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring).
181. Robel, 389 U.S. at 264.
182. Id. at 264, 268 n.20.
183. Id. at 265-66.
184. Id. at 265.
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sion, lS and that the implementation of screening processes by the Depart-
ment of Defense ensured that those individuals with access to sensitive
information did not pose security risks. 186 The Court, therefore, held that
the overbroad, indiscriminate reach of section 5 rendered it a violation of the
first amendment right of association. 8 7 Thus, the Court determined that
mere association with a radical group did not constitute proof that a citizen
shared the unlawful aims of the group. In upholding Robel's first amend-
ment challenge, the Court restricted Congress' authority to declare citizen
members of a radical group subversive based on the mere fact of
membership.
In concurrence, one Justice added that while Congress ordinarily can
make broad delegations of power to the executive branch to implement gen-
eral directives, and realistically must do so, the Constitution limits Congress'
license to delegate power where the statute prescribes criminal penalties and
implicates fundamental liberties.'88 The concurrence also indicated that
Congress neglects its duty to formulate clear, precise policies when it grants
unfettered discretion to executive agencies, which are frequently less ac-
countable to the people than is Congress."8 9
Two Justices dissented in Robel, declaring that the Court had overstepped
its authority and substituted its own judgment for that of Congress in decid-
ing which individuals and groups constitute security threats to the United
States. 90 The dissenters implicitly condoned the statute's substitution of
guilt by association for a finding of personal guilt. 9 ' The dissenting Justices
reasoned that Congress deserved the utmost deference where, as here, Con-
gress made extensive findings regarding the threat to national security posed
by the world Communist movement and the practices the movement used to
185. The Court cited 18 U.S.C. §§ 792-798 (1982) (criminal sanctions for espionage) and
18 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2156 (1982) (criminal sanctions for sabotage). Id.
186. Robel, 389 U.S. at 267 nn.18-19. Early in the opinion, the Court also observed that
President Truman had vetoed the Subversive Activities and Control Act based upon advice he
received from the Departments of Justice, Defense, and State, as well as the CIA, concluding
that the bill would affect adversely their security and intelligence missions. Id. at 259 n. 1.
187. Id. at 261-62. However, the recognition that an individual possesses constitutionally
protected rights and liberties does not prevent Congress or the executive branch from regulat-
ing the exercise of those rights to protect legitimate public interests. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (rejecting a first amendment challenge to the authority of the execu-
tive branch to deny passports to U.S. citizens for travel in Cuba as a necessary restriction on
freedom of action). See also Comment, supra note 8, at 1919-21 (application of prevailing first
amendment standards of review affords adequate protection of national security interests).
188. Robel, 398 U.S. at 274-75 (Brennan, J., concurring).
189. Id. at 276-77.
190. Id. at 285, 288 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White's opinion was joined by Justice
Harlan.
191. Id. at 287.
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carry out its objective of establishing worldwide domination. 92 The dissent-
ers concluded that on the basis of these findings, Congress need not await the
realization of the threat that Communist action groups posed before taking
action against individual members of Communist organizations by severely
restricting their freedom of association.
193
II. THE LEGISLATIVE EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF RESIDENT ALIENS'
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND THE RESPONSE OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS
A. The Temporary Elimination of Deportations Based on Ideology:
Section 901 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
Recently, Congress and the lower federal courts have begun to realign the
scope of first amendment protections afforded resident aliens with that guar-
anteed to citizens. In 1987, Congress enacted temporary legislation, section
901 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (FRAA), which partially
eliminated ideology as a grounds for deportation.' 94 In relevant part, sec-
tion 901(a) provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, no
alien may be . . . subject to deportation because of any past, current, or
expected beliefs, statements, or associations which, if engaged in by a United
States citizen in the United States, would be protected under the Constitu-
tion of the United States."'
195
However, section 901(b) denies this protection to several categories of
aliens.' 96 Section 901(a) does not apply to any alien who the executive
branch finds poses a threat to foreign policy or national security, or any alien
who the Attorney General or consular officials reasonably believes has en-
gaged in, or is likely to engage in, a terrorist activity after entry. 197 In addi-
tion, members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) fall outside
the protection of section 901(a) based strictly upon their membership in the
192. Id. at 285-86.
193. Id. at 287.
194. FRAA, surpa note 9, § 901, 101 Stat. 1331, 1399-1400.
195. Id. As originally enacted in 1987, section 901(a) applied only to deportations based
on activities occurring during 1988. The 1988 amendment extends the application of section
901 to deportation proceedings instituted between December 31, 1987 and January 1, 1991.
See Act of Oct. 1, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-461, 101 Stat. 2268. The legislative history of section
901 emphasized that the protection afforded to aliens was based solely upon the statute, and
that section 901 did not confer a constitutional right. S. REP. No. 75, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5,
reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE CONG., & ADMIN. NEWS 2314, 2425.
196. FRAA, supra note 9, § 901(b)(1) - (2), 101 Stat. at 1399-1400.
197. Id.
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PLO.' 98 Congress also amended section 901(a) in 1988 to restrict its appli-
cation to nonimmigrant aliens,1 99 leaving immigrant aliens2" fully exposed
to deportation based on ideological grounds.20 1
Rafeedie v. INS,2"2 one of the first cases construing the unamended ver-
sion of section 901, presented the question of whether the institution of sum-
mary exclusion procedures against Fouad Rafeedie, a resident alien allegedly
affiliated with the PLO, violated his rights under Section 901(a).2 °3 In 1975,
Rafeedie, an eighteen-year-old native of Jordan, immigrated lawfully to the
United States.2" After his initial entry, he actively promoted Palestinian
and Arab-American causes, writing articles and making radio and television
appearances, which were often critical of United States policies in the Mid-
dle East.20 5
In April 1986, Rafeedie obtained a reentry permit from the INS to visit
his ailing mother in Cyprus and shortly thereafter obtained a visa to Syria
from the Syrian Embassy in Washington, D.C. 20 6 Suspicious of Rafeedie's
purpose in traveling, the INS questioned him and two alleged traveling com-
panions, Tarak Mustafa and Sulieman Shihadeh, upon their return to the
United States.20 7 According to the INS and FBI agents who questioned
him, Rafeedie denied knowing Mustafa and Shihadeh and denied any knowl-
edge of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) or the
198. FRAA, supra note 9, § 901(a)(3), 101 Stat. at 1399-1400. See also 22 U.S.C. § 2691(c)
(1988) (PLO members ineligible for nonimmigrant visas); 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5203 (congres-
sional findings regarding the terrorist activities of the PLO and its affiliates; prohibitions re-
garding the activities of individuals connected with the PLO).
199. The INA of 1952 defines nonimmigrant aliens as representatives of foreign govern-
ments and international organizations, aliens temporarily in the United States for work or
study who have no intent to abandon their foreign residences, and aliens in transit through the
United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(15) (1988).
200. The INA of 1952 defines immigrant aliens as all aliens who do not fall within a spe-
cific nonimmigrant category. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15).
201. FRAA, supra note 9, § 901, 101 Stat. at 1399-1400.
202. 688 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1988).
203. Although the INS contended that Rafeedie must exhaust his administrative remedies,
the district court held that Rafeedie had standing to bring suit. The court reasoned that con-
stitutional questions are beyond the scope of administrative proceedings, especially where one
challenges the very application of those proceedings, and further noted that recourse to judicial
review is presumed when constitutional questions arise. Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 738-40. See
generally 3 C. GORDON & S. MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 8.4a, 8.4b
(1989) (standing contingent upon exhaustion of remedies).
204. Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 731.
205. Id. at 732. Rafeedie claimed that INS initially informed him that he was ineligible for
citizenship because of his political beliefs and associations, then later reversed its decision. The
court noted that INS never completed his application for naturalization or made a final deter-
mination of his eligibility. Id. at 732, & n.7.
206. Id. at 732.
207. Id. at 732-33.
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Palestine Youth Organization (PYO).2° s Shihadeh and Mustafa, however,
admitted knowing Rafeedie, acknowledged attending a meeting of the PYO,
and admitted that the PYO was affiliated with the PFLP.2° In addition, the
agents confiscated photographs and literature linking the three individuals to
the PYO.
210
In March 1987, after the INS made repeated requests to Rafeedie to ap-
pear at its district office to substantiate his claimed purpose in traveling
abroad, the INS formally charged Rafeedie with exclusion under sections
212(a)(27) and (28)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(INA).21' In essence, section 212(a)(27) renders an alien excludable if a con-
sular official or the Attorney General knows or reasonably believes that the
alien will engage in activities adverse to the public interest or security of the
United States.212 Section 212(a)(28)(F) calls for the exclusion of aliens who
advocate the violent overthrow of the United States Government or other
unlawful action including the destruction of property and sabotage, or who
are members or affiliates of any group which advocates those positions.213
208. Id. at 733.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 733-34. The relevant portions of the INA provide:
(27) Aliens who the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason
to believe seek to enter the United States solely, principally, or incidentally to engage
in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the wel-
fare, safety, or security of the United States ....
(28) Aliens who are, or at any time have been, members of any of the following
classes:
(F) Aliens who advocate or teach or who are members of or affiliated with any
organization that advocates or teaches (i) the overthrow by force, violence, or other
unconstitutional means of the Government of the United States or of all forms of
law; or (ii) the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of
any officer ... of the Government of the United States or of any other organized
government ... or (iii) the unlawful damage, injury, or destruction of property; or
(iv) sabotage ....
(29) Aliens with respect to whom the consular officer or the Attorney General
knows or has reasonable ground to believe probably would, after entry, (A) engage in
activities which would be prohibited by the laws of the United States relating to
espionage, sabotage, public disorder, or in any other activity subversive to the na-
tional security, (B) engage in any activity a purpose of which is the opposition to, or
control or the overthrow of, the Government of the United States, by force, violence,
or other unconstitutional means, or (C) join, affiliate with, or participate in the activi-
ties of any organization which is registered or required to be registered under section
786 of Title 50 ....
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27), (28)(F), (29).
212. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27).
213. Id. § 1 182(a)(27), (28). For the text of these provisions, see supra note 211.
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After assignment of Rafeedie's case to an immigration judge, the INS suc-
cessfully moved to close the immigration hearing and instituted summary
exclusion procedures pursuant to section 235(c) of the INA214 against
Rafeedie. 215 The INS took summary action based on confidential informa-
tion, the disclosure of which the INS alleged would undermine national se-
curity. 216 Specifically, the INS asserted that classified information indicated
that Rafeedie was a high ranking member of the PFLP who had fought for
the PFLP in Lebanon in 1982.217 Based on such information, the immigra-
tion judge determined that Rafeedie's readmission to the United States was
adverse to national security.2"' Rafeedie, who continued to deny any affilia-
tion with the PLO, or the PFLP, or any involvement in terrorist activities,
challenged the use of such summary procedures against resident aliens as a
deprivation of due process and free speech rights.2 19
In analyzing Rafeedie's claim that the application of the INA summary
procedures violated his first amendment rights of free speech and associa-
tion,22° the United States District Court for the District of Columbia first
considered whether Rafeedie's activities and affiliations fell within the pro-
tection of section 901 of the FRAA.221 As noted above, section 901 extends
the protection of the first amendment to resident aliens and thereby elimi-
nates any constitutionally permissible exercise of free speech and association
as a legitimate ground for deportation.222 However, the protection of sec-
tion 901 does not extend to any alien who holds membership in or acts as a
214. 8 U.S.C. § 1225. The relevant portion of section 1225(c) provides that:
[i]f the Attorney General is satisfied that the alien is excludable under [8 U.S.C.
§§ 1182(a)(27), (28) or (29)] on the basis of information of a confidential nature, the
disclosure of which the Attorney General, in the exercise of his discretion, and after
consultation with the appropriate security agencies of the Government, concludes
would be prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or security, he may ... order such
alien to be excluded and deported without any inquiry or further inquiry ....
8 U.S.C. § 1225(c).
215. Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 734-35.
216. Id. The Reagan administration increased the use of ideological provisions for exclu-
sions and deportations. Scanlan, supra note 2, at 1496.
217. Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 734.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 731, 737. Rafeedie did not deny his association with the PYO. Id. at 752.
220. The court concluded that Rafeedie could not base his challenge to section 1225(c) on
statutory construction grounds because the provision by its terms clearly applies to resident as
well as entrant aliens. Notably, the court read several Supreme Court decisions as grounded in
constitutional law, not statutory construction, despite language in the opinions to the contrary.
Id. at 743. See Comment, supra note 8, at 1909. The INA of 1952 defines the exclusive proce-
dures by which an alien can seek judicial review of a deportation order. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)
(1982). See also 3 C. GORDON & S. MAILMAN, supra note 203, § 8.9Ab (1989).
221. Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 751. See also FRAA, supra note 9, § 901, 101 Stat. at 1399.
222. Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 751.
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representative of the PLO or who engages in any statutorily defined terrorist
activity.
22 3
Relying on Supreme Court precedent, 224 the district court reasoned that
the government bore the burden of showing that an alien joined a group,
even a group that advocates violence or terrorism, knowing of its unlawful
objectives and intending to act in furtherance of those objectives. 225 The
court concluded that mere membership in the PFLP would not strip an alien
of the first amendment's protection of speech and association.226 The court
based its conclusion on the principle that deportation statutes must be con-
strued in the alien's favor, 2 27 and that section 901(a) does not expressly in-
clude groups affiliated with the PLO while other sections of the FRAA
explicitly do cover such groups.22 8 Conversely, the court recognized that
the legislative history of section 901 supported the INS's claim that
Rafeedie's fund-raising and recruiting activities for the PFLP barred him
from invoking the protection of section 901(a).
2 2 9
In view of the important governmental and individual interests at stake in
Rafeedie, the court did not consider whether the INS excluded Rafeedie
based on protected, innocent activities or because of legitimately proscribed
terrorist related activities. Rather, the Rafeedie court stated that the court
record required development on this issue. 230 The district court further de-
termined that both parties should present evidence on the question of
whether the government or the alien has the burden of proof in showing that
a particular activity falls within the protection of section 901.231 Accord-
ingly, the district court granted a preliminary injunction to Rafeedie to en-
able the parties to prepare arguments on both issues.
2 32
The court's opinion in Rafeedie also noted that subsequent to denying
Rafeedie reentry, the INS released Rafeedie on parole.233 Moreover, the
223. FRAA, supra note 9, § 901(b)(2), 101 Stat. at 1400.
224. Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 752. The Court cited Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) (the first amendment protects advocacy of subversive ideas so long as the speaker does
not intend the speech to incite imminent lawless action and the speech is unlikely to produce
such action). See also NOWAK, supra note 4, § 16.15.
225. Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 752.
226. Id. at 752-53.
227. Lenon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1973) (citing Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333
U.S. 6, 10 (1947)).
228. Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 752-53. See also FRAA, supra note 9, § 901, 101 Stat. at
1399-1400.
229. Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 752-53. See also 133 CoNG. REC. H 11,343 (daily ed. Dec.
14, 1987).
230. Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 753-54.
231. Id. at 753.
232. Id. at 753-54.
233. Id. at 754.
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court emphasized that in the two years following that release the INS never
claimed that Rafeedie engaged in any activity detrimental to national inter-
ests.2 34 Thus, the court concluded that the INS must not have considered
Rafeedie a security threat.235
The government appealed the district court's decision to grant a prelimi-
nary injunction to Rafeedie. 236 Rafeedie also cross appealed the district
court's denial of his motion for summary judgment.237 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district
court's injunctive relief, holding that the government could apply INA sum-
mary procedures only to exclude entrant aliens and not to deny reentry to
resident aliens, such as Rafeedie. 23' However, it indicated that the INS
could proceed to deny Rafeedie reentry pursuant to formal exclusion proce-
dures of the INA.2 39 The Court of Appeals also remanded the case to con-
sider whether the procedural protections of the INA exclusion provisions
violate fifth amendment due process requirements.24 The appellate court
did not mention Rafeedie's first amendment claim. To date, the district
court has made no final decision in Rafeedie, leaving open the question of
the scope of free speech and association rights protected under section
901(a).
B. The Federal Courts Seize the Opportunity to Recognize Resident
Aliens' Full First Amendment Protection
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, in Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, forcefully con-
firmed that according resident aliens the same speech and association rights
as citizens does not undermine legitimate national security interests.24'
Although the case did not involve a challenge to a deportation order, the
court's discussion of the competing interests of the parties demonstrates that
courts can ably apply the same standard of review to citizens' and resident
aliens' first amendment claims.
The Palestine Information Office (PIO) operated in Washington, D.C.
from 1978 until 1987 with an eight-member staff composed of United States
citizens and resident aliens seeking to promote Palestinian views on Middle
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
237. Id.; see also Rafeedie, 688 F. Supp. at 753-54.
238. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 525.
239. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1988) (delineating formal procedures for exclusion).
240. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 525.
241. 853 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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East issues.24 2 Although the PIO's director maintained that the PLO did
not control the office, the PIO did register each year with the Department of
Justice as an agent of the PLO,243 and the director conceded that he did
discuss Middle East issues with the PLO on a regular basis.2" Additionally,
the PLO financed at least part of the PIO's 1987 budget.24 5 As a result, the
State Department in 1987 designated the PIO a foreign mission acting on
behalf of the PLO, and after expressly referring to United States concern
over terrorism, decided that the office must cease functioning as a mission to
protect United States foreign policy interests.246 The PIO and its director
challenged the State Department action as an infringement of the free speech
and association rights of PIO members.247
The court began its analysis of the closure order in Shultz by citing the
extensive control which the executive and legislative branches of government
possess in matters relating to the conduct of foreign relations, especially
where the two branches jointly exercise such power.24 The court sustained
the State Department's authority under the Foreign Missions Act (FMA) to
designate the PIO a foreign mission, and found that the PIO did operate as a
representative of the PLO, thereby upholding the State Department's deter-
mination on that factual question.249
Furthermore, the court found that in acting as a mission, the PIO's activ-
ity comprised both speech and conduct elements. 250 Accordingly, the court
applied a less stringent standard of review which the Supreme Court had
previously established for cases in which the regulated activity included both
speech and conduct components.251 Specifically, the court inquired whether
the government's interest in regulating the conduct element, representation
of a foreign entity, justified the incidental restriction on speech promoting
252Palestinian issues. Reiterating the established principle that the govern-
242. Id. at 935.
243. See Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1988).
244. Shultz, 853 F.2d at 935.
245. Id. The PIO's total budget for 1987 was $350,000. Id
246. Id. at 935-36.
247. Id. at 936. Plaintiffs also challenged the State Department's authority under the For-
eign Missions Act to designate the PIO a foreign mission, and on fifth amendment due process
grounds. Id.
248. Id. at 934, 937.
249. Id. at 937-39.
250. Id. at 939.
251. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (holding that the regulation must
lie within the government's constitutional power, further an important or substantial govern-
ment interest, which is unrelated to restriction of free speech, and there must be no less drastic
alternative).
252. Shultz 853 F.2d at 939-40.
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ment enjoys broad power in the area of foreign relations, the court stated
that closing a foreign mission certainly falls within the government's consti-
tutional powers.2 53 The court reasoned that the mission's closing only re-
quired the PIO to cease functioning as a foreign agent of the PLO and did
not restrict the individuals involved from advocating the Palestinian cause.
Therefore, the action only incidentally restricted speech.25
The court also acknowledged the government's substantial, nonspeech re-
lated interest in closing the missions of foreign entities to which the United
States does not extend diplomatic recognition.2 55 In addition, the court
found that the State Department had available to it no less drastic alterna-
tives to closing the PIO by which to foreclose the unauthorized representa-
tion of the PLO.2 56  The court, therefore, concluded that the State
Department action taken pursuant to the FMA did not unduly impair the
plaintiffs' exercise of free speech.
257
In considering the PIO's free association claim, the court held that the
closing of the mission did not violate the individuals' association rights be-
cause they remained free to associate together in order to promote the same
causes and positions that they advocated prior to closing.2 58 Moreover, rec-
ognizing that the closing order prevented the individuals from representing
the PLO and thereby restricted their right to associate with the PLO, the
court stated that the right to free association is not absolute and does not
include the right to represent a foreign entity.259 The court reasoned that
even if the closing incidentally impaired association rights, the government's
strong interest in demonstrating a clear policy against international terror-
ism justified the restriction. 26
Notably, the court did not consider the question of whether the State De-
partment's action to close the PIO, so integrally related to the conduct of
foreign affairs, was immune from review. The court likewise did not apply a
different standard of review for the first amendment claims of the resident
aliens and United States citizens. Rather, the court showed great deference
to the government's policy decision regarding nonrecognition of the PLO,
yet remained willing and able to balance the state and individual interests at
stake in evaluating the State Department's action. Thus, the court rejected a
253. Id. at 940.
254. Id. at 939.




259. Id. at 940-41.
260. Id. at 941-42.
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blanket characterization of executive and congressional exercises of author-
ity in the area of foreign affairs as political questions.
Similarly, once the federal courts began to subject provisions of the INA
to meaningful review, various provisions of the Act could not withstand the
scrutiny of first amendment challenges.2 61 For example, in American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Meese,2 62 the INS charged two resident
aliens with deportation pursuant to the 1952 INA based on the aliens' par-
ticipation in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).26 3 In
response, the resident aliens facially challenged several provisions of the
INA2 " and section 901 of the FRAA 265 as contrary to the first amend-
ment.2 66 Six other resident aliens and several organizations joined the suit as
plaintiffs.
2671
The relevant sections of the INA provide for the deportation of any resi-
dent alien who at any time after entry advocated the doctrines of world com-
munism, the unlawful destruction of property, the opposition to all
organized government, or who were members or affiliates of a group that
taught or advocated any of those doctrines.268 Section 901(b) of the FRAA
denies constitutional protection to several classes of aliens including aliens
who pose a threat to national security or foreign policy interests, aliens who
consular officials or the United States Attorney General reasonably believe
have engaged in or are likely to engage in terrorist activity (either as individ-
uals or as members of an organization), and aliens who are members of the
PLO.269 Section 901(a) as amended affords constitutional protection only to
nonimmigrant aliens.2 7 °
The court in American-Arab began its opinion in a remarkable manner,
holding that aliens within the United States enjoy the full protection of the
first amendment, and that notwithstanding the government's plenary power
over immigration, this protection does not vanish in the deportation con-
261. See Comment, supra note 8, at 1910.
262. 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
263. Id. at 1063; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6)( F)(iii) (1988).
264. American-Arab, 714 F. Supp. at 1062-63. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6)(D), (F)(iii), (G)(v) and (H). 714 F. Supp. at 1062.
265. FRAA, supra note 9, § 901, 101 Stat. at 1399-1400.
266. American-Arab, 714 F. Supp. at 1062-63.
267. Id. at 1062. The organizational plaintiffs included several American-Arab groups, the
Irish National Caucus, the American Friends Service Committee, the League of United Latin
American Citizens and the Southern California Interfaith Task Force on Central America. Id.
268. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6)(D), (F)(iii), (G)(v) and (H).
269. FRAA, supra note 9, § 901(b)(1), (2), (3), 101 Stat. at 1399-1400.
270. FRAA, supra note 9, § 901(a), 101 Stat. at 1399.
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text.2 7' Moreover, the court found that the resident aliens were entitled to
first amendment guarantees independent of section 901(a).2 72 Accordingly,
the court proceeded to determine the constitutionality of the relevant provi-
sions of the INA by applying traditional first amendment principles in its
review without differentiating between the scope of protection enjoyed by
resident aliens and citizens.273
First, the court turned to the issue of the plaintiffs' standing, noting that in
a preenforcement first amendment challenge, the law must expose the chal-
lenger to a real threat of prosecution which both subjectively and objectively
chills the challenger's exercise of first amendment rights.274 Factors the
court considered in making this determination included "the government's
interest in enforcing the challenged statute, along with its past enforcement
patterns, and the party's interest in engaging in the prohibited activity.
' 275
The court noted that the government had pursued past prosecutions and had
not disavowed an intent to enforce the provisions in the future.276 Thus, the
court determined that the government possessed a strong, continuing inter-
est in prosecuting members of the PFLP under the INA's ideological depor-
tation provisions.
2 77
In addition, the court found that the plaintiffs evidenced a genuine interest
in participating in the PFLP, and that but for the challenged provisions, they
would engage in the proscribed expressive activities.278 With respect to the
two resident aliens charged with deportation, the court held that the two
resident aliens lacked standing to challenge the provisions because they had
not exhausted their administrative remedies. 279 However, the court recog-
nized the standing of the organizational plaintiffs and the six other resident
aliens .28  Furthermore, the court ruled that the plaintiffs did not have to be
under a final order of deportation in order to make a facial challenge to a
271. American-Arab, 714 F. Supp. at 1063. Cf Hesse, supra note 2, at 282-87 (Harisiades
marks the divergence in the standards of review applicable to resident aliens' and citizens' first
amendment claims). See also 2 C. GORDON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 4.3d
n.27c (Cum. Supp. Aug. 1989) (noting the district court's ruling that citizens and aliens enjoy
the same first amendment protection and concluding that an appeal is inevitable).
272. American-Arab, 714 F. Supp. at 1063.
273. Id. at 1063, 1079-82.
274. Id. at 1064-65.
275. Id. at 1066.
276. Id. at 1066-68.
277. Id. at 1067. Although some commentators have observed a decreased use of the ideo-
logical provisions for deportation over the last two decades, Scanlan notes that the Reagan
administration stepped up the use of ideological provisions for deportation. Scanlan, supra
note 2, at 1496.
278. American-Arab, 714 F. Supp. at 1067.
279. Id. at 1064.
280. Id. at 1070-71.
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statute which potentially renders them deportable. Instead, the court may
review the law even if the two resident aliens who lacked standing were cur-
rently involved in deportation proceedings in another forum.281  The court
emphasized that its concurrent review was appropriate because a delay in
hearing the case could result in suppression of protected speech.282 Thus,
influenced by the fact that the resident aliens' first amendment interests were
at stake, the American-Arab court resolved the question of standing in favor
of the organizational plaintiffs and the six resident aliens who were not
charged under the challenged provisions.28 3
Next, the court addressed the merits of the plaintiffs' claim that the INA
provisions violated their first amendment rights. Surprisingly, the court con-
sidered the notion that resident aliens enjoy first amendment protection
equal in scope to the protection afforded United States citizens a long settled
issue. 2 4 The court relied primarily upon the concurrence in Bridges v.
Wixon 28 5 and an expansive reading of the Supreme Court's opinion in Hari-
siades v. Shaughnessy 28 6 to reach this conclusion. 287  In particular, the
American-Arab court's analysis of Harisiades focused solely on the Supreme
Court's cursory reference to prior precedent 288 to conclude that the Supreme
Court had applied the same standard of review then existing for a citizen's
first amendment challenge. 28 9 The district court's reading of Harisiades at-
tributed a much stronger commitment to the first amendment rights of aliens
than the full Harisiades opinion indicated.2 9 °
The district court in American-Arab also distinguished the Supreme
Court's decision in Galvan v. Press29' as not presenting a first amendment
claim.292 Yet, the Supreme Court in Galvan upheld mere membership in a
proscribed organization as constitutional grounds for deportation.2 93 The
Galvan decision, therefore, had adverse implications for future defendants'
281. Id. at 1073.
282. Id. at 1065.
283. Id. at 1070-71.
284. Id. at 1074.
285. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 157 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring).
286. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
287. American-Arab, 714 F. Supp. at 1074-84.
288. In Harisiades, the Court made only a footnote reference to its opinion in Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (holding that Congress can constitutionally prohibit speech
that presents an imminent threat to national security). Harisiades, 342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952).
289. American-Arab, 714 F. Supp. at 1077.
290. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 592.
291. 347 U.S. 522 (1953).
292. 714 F. Supp. at 1075.
293. 347 U.S. at 530-31.
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first amendment challenges to similar provisions.2 94 The district court also
distinguished other Supreme Court decisions in which the Court applied a
deferential standard of review to ideological provisions for deportation.295
With respect to those decisions, the district court stated that none of the
cases involved a first amendment challenge in a deportation setting.296
Through selective use of precedent, the district court concluded that citizens
and resident aliens possess the same first amendment freedoms.
297
Having thus rejected the government's argument that resident aliens in a
deportation context do not enjoy the same first amendment protection as
citizens, the court stated that no rational reason existed to subject resident
aliens to deportation for advocating certain positions while allowing citizens
and United States corporations to advocate the same positions.29' Likewise,
the court explicitly recognized that aliens contribute to the marketplace of
ideas valued by the first amendment and that to restrict resident aliens'
rights in a deportation setting diminished the integrity of their rights in all
contexts. 299 Accordingly, the court determined that first amendment princi-
ples do not vary for a resident alien challenging a statutory scheme. Rather,
what will vary is whether the government interest under a given set of cir-
cumstances outweighs the claimed first amendment interest. 300
Furthermore, in view of the inapplicability of the ex post facto clause, the
court considered recognition of the full constitutional scope of resident
aliens' first amendment rights essential to protect their free speech rights.3°'
Without the full protection of the first amendment, the government could
enact a statute rendering aliens deportable for past speech, and as a result
chill free expression because an alien could not predict whether his speech
might subject him to deportation in the future.3 °2
Additionally, the court determined that application of the same first
amendment review for both citizens and resident aliens adequately protected
the substantial interests of the government in the areas of national security
and foreign policy.303 The court specifically noted that prevailing first
amendment principles would allow the government to deport aliens for ad-
294. American-Arab, 714 F. Supp. at 1075. The Government argued that aliens do not
possess such rights in the deportation context. Id. See Hesse, supra note 2, at 289.
295. American-Arab, 714 F. Supp. at 1075.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1075-76.
298. Id. at 1079.
299. Id. at 1081.
300. Id. at 1082 n.18.
301. Id. at 1081-82.




vocating unlawful conduct or even for affiliation with a group, provided that
the government showed that such affiliation presented a legitimate threat. 3°
The court then analyzed whether the deportation provisions of the INA
were overbroad. Relying upon the Supreme Court's established test for
overbreadth,3 °5 the court first addressed the question of whether the provi-
sions reached a substantial amount of constitutionally protected activity.
30 6
The court noted that the INA provisions at issue went far beyond prohibit-
ing advocacy " 'directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and.., likely to... produce such action.' ,307 In fact, the court found that
the provisions "proscribe almost exclusively" protected activity through the
broad curtailment of dissemination and possession of literature that es-
poused prohibited ideas.308
Reasoning from prior Supreme Court decisions, 309 the court stated that
Congress could not constitutionally equate advocacy or teaching of a pro-
scribed doctrine with incitement to unlawful action.3 10 The court further
noted that the INA provisions impermissibly imputed guilt by mere associa-
tion, and in this manner reached a substantial amount of innocent, protected
free speech and association. 3 1  As a result, the court held each of the chal-
lenged INA provisions facially invalid.3 12 However, the court did not ad-
dress the constitutionality of section 901, having decided that all aliens
within the United States enjoy constitutional protection independent of that
statute's provisions. Thus, whether Congress can constitutionally limit the
scope of first amendment protection accorded to immigrant aliens based on
mere association remains open to speculation.
C. The Uncertain Status of Resident Aliens' First Amendment Freedoms
The Supreme Court's initial review of United States immigration law
firmly established a deferential analysis of deportation statutes. The Court
declared that Congress possessed an inherent power, derived from interna-
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1082-83. See NOWAK" supra note 4, § 16.8 (noting that an overbroad statute
reaches constitutionally protected activities as well as activities which legislatures legitimately
can proscribe).
306. American-Arab, 714 F. Supp. at 1083.
307. Id. at 1082-83 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)); see also
NOWAK, supra note 4, § 16.15.
308. American-Arab, 714 F. Supp. at 1083.
309. Id. Specifically, the district court relied upon the standards of review the Supreme
Court set forth in Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961), and Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957), rev'd sub nom. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
310. American-Arab, 714 F. Supp. at 1083.
311. Id. at 1083-84.
312. Id. at 1084.
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tional law, to deport resident aliens. The early Court opinions also charac-
terized congressional exercise of the power to deport as a political question
and thus virtually immune from judicial review and constitutional con-
straints. Accordingly, congressional enactments of deportation provisions
based on ideological association escaped meaningful judicial review.
Only recently, Congress granted free speech and association rights to cer-
tain classes of aliens, and almost immediately thereafter began to constrict
those freedoms. However, in the last two years, two federal courts have
recognized the full constitutional scope of resident aliens' first amendment
rights, independent of any statutory grant from Congress. Thus, the stan-
dard of review of resident aliens' first amendment claims is currently in a
state of flux.
III. RESIDENT ALIENS: STRANGERS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The Absence of a Rationale for Deferential Review of United States
Immigration Law
A false premise supports the Court's excessively deferential review of im-
migration law. The Court in Fong Yue Ting v. United States313 presumed
that Congress had absolute power over deportation derived from the inher-
ent powers of sovereign nations to control the presence of foreigners within
their borders. 314 Assuming that the majority's interpretation of interna-
tional law principles was correct, 315 this conclusion nonetheless ignored the
fact that the Constitution imposes limits on Congress' powers, express and
implied, in the realm of international affairs. Thus, contrary to the implicit
assumption in Fong Yue Ting,316 the fact that Congress possesses a given
power does not resolve the question of whether Congress has exercised its
power in a manner consistent with the Constitution.317 Nonetheless, the
Court's earliest decisions established that the constitutional guarantee of due
process provided no protection to resident aliens faced with deportation, and
also set a dangerous precedent for future first amendment challenges.
313. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
314. Id. at 698, 705-07, 713.
315. Id. at 732-63 (Brewer, J., Field, J., and Fuller, J., dissenting). See also Scanlan, supra
note 2, at 1499-1500.
316. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 698.
317. See Schuck, supra note 2, at 14; Hesse, supra note 2, at 282, 287. See also American-
Arab, 714 F. Supp. at 1077-82.
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B. The Extension of Deferential Review to First Amendment Challenges
in the Deportation Context
Without further analysis of the presumption that Congress possessed ple-
nary power over deportation, the Court extended its deferential review of
resident aliens' first amendment challenges to deportation orders. After the
Supreme Court declared that Congress had free reign over immigration, the
Court further presumed in United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams318 that
legislative enactments in the area of immigration were simply policy deci-
sions. The Court, therefore, labeled the ideological grounds for deportation
unreviewable political questions. 319 Thus, in Turner, the Court permitted
Congress to decide which ideas were inimical to the public interest and to
render resident aliens who held such ideas deportable.32°
The Court's subsequent decision in Bridges v. Wixon 321 reflected a tempo-
rary departure from the Court's absolute deference in reviewing immigration
law. The Court narrowed mere affiliation as a ground for deportation by
requiring that the government demonstrate that Bridges had engaged in
meaningful association with the CPUSA and that he shared its unlawful
aims. The Court also equated deportation with severe criminal punishment.
Yet, the Court's decision in Bridges represented a short-lived, incomplete
change in the Court's position regarding Congress' plenary power over im-
migration matters. Moreover, a majority of the Court in Bridges primarily
based its conclusion on statutory construction, reflecting its hesitancy to af-
ford a resident alien's free speech and association rights full constitutional
protection. Only Justice Murphy's concurrence strongly supported unequiv-
ocal recognition of resident aliens' first amendment freedoms.
In contrast, the Court's later opinion in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy32 2 typi-
fied its extreme deference towards legislative decisions infringing upon first
amendment freedoms in the deportation field. Again, the Court declared
that Congress could revoke at will the resident alien's right to remain in the
United States. The Court also condoned guilt by mere association, no mat-
ter how innocent or brief the resident aliens' association with a legislatively
proscribed group.32 3 Harisiades marked the Court's permanent retreat from
any first amendment limitation of Congress' plenary power to define the
grounds for deportation.
318. 194 U.S. 279 (1904).
319. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 705-06; The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581
(1889), aff'g, Chae Chan Ping, 36 F. 431 (C.D. Cal. 1888).
320. 194 U.S. at 279.
321. 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
322. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
323. Id. at 592.
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Thus, the Court rendered Congress' assumptions regarding the foreign
source of radical ideas and the undesirability of resident aliens possessing
such ideas immune from constitutional challenge. In this manner, the
Court's rationale conflicts with the basic function of the Constitution to de-
fine the legitimate scope of congressional authority.324 Instead of the Consti-
tution placing a limitation on Congress, the Court has permitted Congress to
redefine constitutional guarantees and to ignore the first amendment when
legislating in the deportation field.
C. Recent Attempts to Realign the Scope of Citizens' and Resident Aliens'
Free Speech and Association Rights
Congress recently took steps to eliminate ideology as grounds for deporta-
tion of resident aliens. However, legislative solutions are inherently inade-
quate because Congress can easily modify and repeal its immigration
legislation. Furthermore, the recent amendments to section 901 of the
FRAA325 indicate that Congress intends to continue constricting resident
aliens' first amendment protections based upon mere association with disfa-
vored groups. For example, Congress specifically barred members of the
PLO from invoking the protection of section 901 for their free speech and
association activities. 26 Similarly, Congress limited the protection of sec-
tion 901 to nonimmigrant aliens while immigrant aliens, who by definition
want to stay in the United States, remain subject to ideological deporta-
tion."' Thus, legislative solutions represent inadequate remedies because
they leave resident aliens dependent upon the ever changing, seemingly unre-
viewable political process.
The federal courts, recognizing the lack of a rational basis in distinguish-
ing between the scope of citizens' and resident aliens' first amendment free-
doms, have begun to subject deportation statutes and other laws affecting the
free speech rights of resident aliens to meaningful review. 28 In the process,
these courts have demonstrated their ability to balance the competing indi-
vidual and state interests at stake without impairing legitimate national se-
curity interests. Thus, the court in Palestine Information Office v. Shultz
accorded due deference to the government's authority to close foreign mis-
sions of unrecognized foreign entities finding it a foreign policy determina-
324. See NOWAK, supra note 4, § 1.3 (discussing the United States Constitution as the
supreme law of the land).
325. FRAA, supra note 9, § 901, 101 Stat. 1331, 1399-1400.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. See, e.g., American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060
(C.D. Cal. 1989); Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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tion. In contrast, the court closely reviewed the closing of the PIO, a specific
action taken pursuant to the policy determination, to decide whether that
action violated the first amendment. Although the court concluded that the
government could constitutionally close the PIO, it reached that result only
after determining that the closing had merely an incidental impact on the
free speech and association rights of the resident aliens and citizens involved,
and that the government's interest outweighed the incidental restriction.
In addition, the court in American-Arab 32 9 determined that characterizing
Congress' power over deportation as plenary did not exempt the exercise of
that power from the limits of the first amendment. While the American-
Arab court's interpretation of prior Supreme Court decisions is questionable,
the court's reasons for applying the same standard of review to citizens' and
resident aliens' first amendment claims, and its analysis of the merits of each
party's arguments constitutes a superior treatment of those issues. Further-
more, the district court's reasoned analysis affords meaningful first amend-
ment protection and promotes the underlying values of the first amendment.
IV. COMMENT
Although the Supreme Court has stated that resident aliens enjoy the pro-
tection of the first amendment, the Court's characterization of Congress' de-
portation power as plenary preempts any meaningful consideration of the
scope of resident aliens' free speech and association rights. Under the
Court's most recent pronouncements, the first amendment protection af-
forded resident aliens remains, at best, nominal. The viability of a protection
that vanishes in the deportation context is troublesome. Under this ration-
ale, as soon as Congress determines that a given class of resident aliens is
deportable, apparently on whatever ideological basis it chooses, the resident
aliens cannot invoke the Constitution to challenge the congressional deci-
sion. The Court thus permits Congress to inflict a drastic punishment for
the mere exercise of what would otherwise be constitutionally protected free
speech.
Furthermore, the Court's continued reluctance to recognize the full scope
of resident aliens' first amendment rights reflects a flawed analysis of consti-
tutional law. Over one hundred years ago, the Court declared that Congress
possessed an extra-constitutional, virtually unreviewable power over immi-
gration. The Court announced its position without analyzing the merits of
resident aliens' claims of protection under the first amendment. The Court
also failed to consider whether Congress had any basis for deeming entire
classes of resident aliens subversive because of views they espoused or be-
329. 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
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cause of views imputed to them through past or present affiliations with dis-
favored groups. Instead, the Court throughout its decisions simply accepted
Congress' assumptions concerning the undesirability of aliens who possess
views not shared by mainstream society. Thus, the Court allowed Congress
to define acceptable beliefs and make resident aliens' right to remain in the
United States contingent upon conformity with those beliefs.
The result of the Supreme Court's decisions concerning ideological depor-
tation is completely at odds with the underlying values of the first amend-
ment. A truly free exchange of ideas includes all ideas, not merely those
Congress statutorily defines as acceptable. The ideological provisions for de-
portation embody fears of revolution instigated and imported from abroad
and a presumption that aliens are disloyal.3 30 However, the threat that Con-
gress perceived from the various groups that it deemed radical has never
materialized. 331' Additionally, Congress' attempt to control the domestic di-
alogue does not achieve its stated purpose of preserving democratic institu-
tions. Deporting a resident alien who espouses a radical idea will not
prevent internal dissension because revolutionary ideas are not simply for-
eign imports. Moreover, if dissension manifests itself in a constitutionally
permissible exercise of free speech, Congress has no authority to prevent that
dissension.
On the other hand, under prevailing first amendment standards, Congress
does possess the authority to regulate conduct and speech which threatens
imminent harm. The ability to regulate and punish individuals whose con-
duct or speech threatens a legitimate public interest makes it unnecessary to
deny resident aliens the full protection of the first amendment. Any dispar-
ity in treatment of citizens' and resident aliens' claims is devoid of merit
because neither the Court nor the Congress ever demonstrated or even
clearly articulated how the exercise of free speech and association rights by
resident aliens poses a greater threat than the exercise of those same rights
by citizens. Therefore, the Court should cease its application of a deferential
standard of review where deportation statutes adversely affect the exercise of
first amendment freedoms by resident aliens.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress has yet to demonstrate that resident aliens' exercise of free
speech and association rights is more dangerous than citizens' exercise of
those same first amendment freedoms. Accordingly, a false premise under-
lies the disparity in treatment of their respective first amendment challenges.
330. Tilner, supra note 8, at 34-35.
331. Tilner, supra note 8, at 79-80.
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First amendment principles should not vary based upon the plaintiff's status
as a citizen or resident alien.332 The prevailing first amendment standards of
review applicable to citizens' first amendment challenges adequately protect
legitimate national security and foreign policy interests, and the federal
courts have proven their ability to assess the competing interests of the Fed-
eral Government and resident aliens in the immigration context.333 The
courts can accord due deference to policy determinations while reviewing
closely the actions taken pursuant to those determinations for infringements
of resident aliens' first amendment freedoms.
Moreover, legislative solutions are inherently inadequate because they
subject the resident alien to the whim of the political process. The ease and
frequency with which Congress has amended the United States immigration
laws over the last century illustrates the inadequacy of a legislative guaran-
tee. The Supreme Court's failure to recognize that the United States Consti-
tution protects resident aliens' first amendment freedoms permits Congress
to limit legislative grants of free speech and association rights to certain cate-
gories of aliens. Conversely, judicial recognition that all persons lawfully
residing within the United States enjoy the full scope of constitutional pro-
tection of first amendment freedoms effects a uniform standard more in
keeping with the spirit of the first amendment. Accordingly, the Court
should seize the first opportunity presented to recognize the full scope of
resident aliens' free speech and association rights.
Heather R. Henthorne
332. American-Arab, 714 F. Supp. at 1060.
333. Shultz. 853 F.2d 932.
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